European Journal of Pragmatism and European Philosophy
What Pragmatism May Learn from Common Sense
mardi 23 janvier 2018,
http://journals.openedition.org/ejp...
We generally consider that we should not believe on the basis of insufficient evidence. Yet there are many beliefs which are deprived of adequate epistemic evidence. In such cases, James recommends the “subjective method†which allows us to hold beliefs for practical reasons. This pragmatist move is rejected by evidentialists who think that beliefs must be grounded on adequate epistemic evidence. My contention is that Reid’s approach to irresistible beliefs we do not hold for epistemic reasons offers a persuasive means to escape the contemporary stalemate between evidentialism and pragmatism. Are we rational in holding beliefs for which we don’t possess sufficient epistemic evidence ?
Reid and James subscribe to a permissivist ethics of belief, according to which we are allowed to hold a belief even if we cannot show its epistemic credentials. Yet I show that the abandonment of the stringent evidentialist requirement (which is tied to a form of internalism) does not necessarily commit one to a pure form of pragmatism (which offers practical reasons instead of epistemic ones). If Reid proposes arguments built on a pragmatist line, he does not reject the evidentialist demand per se, only its internalist form. Moreover, in his view, immediate beliefs are carried by a kind of instinctive epistemic trust. On the whole, pragmatism and common sense do not defend the same kind of epistemic permissivism.
Maîtresse de conférences
Philosophie britannique moderne, philosophie analytique de la connaissance
Courrier électronique : Angélique Thébert
Sous la direction de Céline Chérici, Jean-Claude Dupont et Charles T. Wolfe
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Sous la direction de Rebecca Copenhaver (Lewis & Clark College) et Todd Buras (Baylor University)
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